Introduction

At the International Day for Biological Diversity in New York City in May 2007 UN official John Scott asked “governments and parties to ‘respect’ Indigenous knowledge and culture.” He thus added political pressure to the movement to include Indigenous knowledges and practices into our academic and scientific discourses that had gained momentum since the late 1990s. In several parts of the world, Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars call for ‘indigenizing the academy’, mainly in response to a large-scale dismissal of Indigenous knowledges in Western discourses.

The Mi’kmaw scholar Marie Battiste is one of the most determined researchers on Indigenous knowledges and education in Canada. She explains:

Indigenous knowledge comprises the complex set of technologies developed and sustained by Indigenous civilizations. Often oral and symbolic, it is transmitted through the structure of Indigenous languages and passed on to the next generation through modeling, practice, and animation, rather than through the written word. [...] It is a knowledge system in its own right with its own internal consistency and ways of knowing, and there are limits to how far it can be comprehended from a

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1 There is no widely accepted definition of the concept of ‘Indigenous’, in part because of the great diversity of Indigenous people worldwide; neither has the UN adopted an official definition. The UN works with the following guidelines that serve to approximate the concept and that are employed here as well: self-identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by the community as their member; historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies; strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources; distinct social, economic or political systems; distinct language, culture and beliefs; form non-dominant groups of society; resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities (United Nations Permanent Forum, n.p.).

Eurocentric point of view. [...] Indigenous knowledge is an adaptable, dynamic system based on skills, abilities, and problem-solving techniques that change over time depending on environmental conditions. (Battiste 2002, 2, 11)

Battiste thus understands Indigenous knowledge as a knowledge system, cultural practices and technologies that are not fixed, as is often assumed in Western thought, but that change continuously and adapt to environments, dynamic cultural influences and political practices. Its premises are grounded in holism and relational worldviews, it defies categorization, and it operates, if we borrow Western categories, in an interdisciplinary and transcultural mode (Battiste 2005, 4).

The epistemic dismissal of Indigenous knowledges comes as a legacy of colonial histories and global neocolonial relations, mainly displaced and unrecognized, where Indigenous social and political structures, knowledges, religions, and philosophies were seen as inferior, insignificant, and even barbaric by the Western world. According to a Western\(^3\) logo-centric and Cartesian understanding of science and knowledge, Indigenous knowledges have largely been viewed as primitive, folkloric, anecdotal, unscientific, and insignificant (cf. Hobson, n.p.; Grenier, 40). However, selected Indigenous ideas and practices were adapted into Western ideas and practices, such as the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy that influenced the Constitution of the United States and its democratic principles (“American History Myths Debunked”, n.p.; American Indian Institute, n.p.). Indigenous cultures in North America were also idealized in Western romantic literary traditions as much as their relations towards nature and the environment and connected spiritual ideas continue to be idealized by some groups in Western cultures. Indigenous environmental ethics and spiritual thought and practices were specifically appropriated by environmentalist initiatives and organisations, and even misappropriated in esoteric and New Ageist circles. In recent years, Indigenous knowledges were considered as essential in Western studies of Indigenous cultures, literatures, and histories, so called Indigenous studies, which have come to be researched and taught increasingly by Indigenous scholars themselves in the past years. Western knowledge sys-

\(^{3}\) I employ the terms ‘Western’ and ‘Eurocentric” as denoting political, cultural, economic, and intellectual thought and practice with roots in European societies and knowledge traditions that spread throughout the world during the colonial era, and ‘non-Western’ as denoting thoughts and practices generated in non-European cultures, societies and knowledge traditions.

It is not the intent of this edition to pit Indigenous and non-Indigenous or Western and non-Western cultures, societies, knowledge systems and practices against each other. These concepts themselves cannot be clearly defined and get increasingly blurred through transcultural dynamics in present societies of the globalized world. Rather, the edition seeks to explore epistemological power relations and the relationship between different knowledge systems and their respective practices. Likewise it is not assumed that there are unified Indigenous or Western understandings of knowledge and knowledge practices.
tems are very diverse as much as Indigenous ones. Some strands of science, such as quantum physics, emphasize connectivity and relationality between matter and space or between an object and its universe and the existence of parallel universes and states of any object; some strands of philosophy, such as metaphysics, explore the complexity of the existence of beings and objects, which show certain parallels to holistic Indigenous philosophies and interconnections between the natural and the supernatural. Likewise, some Western scientists and scholars have recognized Indigenous knowledge and accommodated Indigenous ideas. In 1992, Arctic researcher George Hobson writes:

> In terms of the northern experience, science also equates to traditional knowledge, and southern scientists must never forget that traditional knowledge is science. [...] From our scientific ivory towers we tend to ignore basic knowledge that is available to us. However, as southern scientists, it is absolutely necessary that we develop a system to provide traditional knowledge with a “scientific” framework that allows native and scientific knowledge to interact in a complementary fashion. Southern scientists must learn that “western” scientific knowledge and native knowledge and experience both have validity. (Hobson, n.p.; emphasis in original)

Since the 1990s, traditional Indigenous knowledge is gradually accepted as integral part of sciences relating to the environment (Hobson, n.p.); however much work in the way of epistemological recognition has to be done (cf. Kunuk/Mauro 2010). For example, the theoretical physicist David Peat (1994) respectfully merges his understanding of Indigenous knowledges with his own knowledge and discusses integrated anthropology, history, metaphysics, cosmology, and quantum physics, arguing that Western ideas of quantum physics and Indigenous holism have more common premises and ideas than is generally assumed. And yet, Indigenous scholars perceive the Western academy – in all probability empirically-based strands of the academy – as assigning primacy to knowledge based on Western rationality, logic, science, and empirical proof and excluding knowledge based on observation, oral tradition, digressive thinking, and spiritual relations to one's environment, and Indigenous epistemologies as being associated with the latter categories. Therefore, as a Western-based logic suggests, Indigenous knowledges do not belong to the normatized and legitimate materialistic realm of science, reason, and logic. Battiste argues that Western educational institutions have disclaimed Indigenous knowledges and nurtured the belief that non-Western cultures “contribute nothing to the development of knowledge, humanities, arts, science, and technology” (Battiste

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4 I thank Birgit Däwes for pointing out to me the works of David Peat and Gregory Cajete.
2005, 2; cf. Grenier 9). She describes this longstanding Eurocentric disclaiming practice as “cognitive imperialism”:

Cognitive imperialism is a form of cognitive manipulation used to disclaim other knowledge bases and values. Validated through one’s knowledge base and empowered through public education, it has been the means by which whole groups of people have been denied existence and have had their wealth confiscated. Cognitive imperialism denies people their language and cultural integrity by maintaining the legitimacy of only one language, one culture, and one frame of reference. (9)

This same Eurocentric notion has been applied to other Indigenous knowledges around the world as well. The Sami scholar Rauna Kuokkanen says: “[T]he academy has ignored, overlooked, and dismissed [Indigenous] ontologies – in fact, the academy’s structures and discourses are built on the assumption that there only is one episteme, one ontology, one intellectual tradition on which to rely and from which to draw” (3). The African American scholar Gloria Emeagwali terms this practice Eurocentric “intellectual dominance” and holds:

Several strategies have been used to reinforce the myth that regions outside Europe contributed nothing to the development of science and technology either in terms of hardware or software – the view that historically the majority of the world have been passive recipients of a so-called Western science and technology. (n.p.)

These strategies include the selective omission of information, the Europeanization of non-European scholars and their inventions and scientific documents, double standards of assessment, and manipulation of dates. For example the Syrian/Lebanese sources of the Greek alphabet were invalidated as well as Mayan, Hindu, and Arabic numerals, the idea of zero and algebraic notations that form the basis for contemporary mathematics. Likewise, a comet identified by Chinese astronomers 2,500 years ago is attributed to Haley (Battiste 2005, 2; Emeagwali 2014, n.p.). Hamid Dabashi, Iranian American scholar, provocatively asks with his book title *Can Non-Europeans Think?* (2015), a book where he extends his thoughts on the accepted ‘primacy’ of European thinkers in what is assumed to be philosophy proper. Western philosophy, with exceptions such as Arthur Schopenhauer’s incorporations of Hindu and Buddhist philosophical ideas (Barua 2008) and influences of Indian philosophy on the American transcendentalists (Riepe 1967), largely only recognizes Eurocentric scholars and their work as philosophical thought, with “imperial hubris” relegating historical and contemporary philosophers from the Arab and Muslim world, Africa, Asia, and Latin America to the niche of ‘ethnophilosophy’, and thus assuring “a sense of [the West’s] own universalism and globality” (Dabashi, 36). He says:
Žižek and his fellow philosophers are oblivious to those [non-Western] geographies because they cannot read any other script, any other map than the colonial script and the colonial map with which Europeans have read and navigated the world; conversely they cannot read any other script or map because they are blinded to alternative geographies that resistance to that colonialism had written and navigated. (10)

This is, according to Walter D. Mignolo, “an unconscious dismissal that has run through the history of the coloniality of power in its epistemic and ontological spheres: the self-assumed Eurocentrism (the world seen, described and mapped from European perspectives and interests)” (2015, ix) – a dismissal he has elsewhere termed “the coloniality of knowledge” after the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano (Quijano 1992; Mignolo 2007). In a similar vein, the Argentinean philosopher Enrique D. Dussel argues that the phenomena of ‘modernity’ are understood as exclusively Eurocentric and that Eurocentric knowledges and cultures superseded non-Eurocentric ones, an intellectual development he terms the “Eurocentric paradigm”:

Europe had, according to this paradigm, exceptional *internal* characteristics that allowed it to supersede, through its rationality, all other cultures. […] This thesis, which I will call the “Eurocentric paradigm” (in opposition to the “world paradigm”), is the one that has imposed itself not only in Europe and the United States, but also in the entire intellectual world of the world periphery. (Dussel 2003, 53-54; emphasis in original)

Mignolo connects the “coloniality of power (economic and political)” with the “coloniality of knowledge and of being (gender, sexuality, subjectivity and knowledge)” as entangled characteristics of modern society that constantly reproduce “coloniality” (2007, 450-52). In his “Orders of Discourse”, Michel Foucault has brought knowledge and power together as interlinked functions of society, arguing that the “will to truth [knowledge]” is a veiled “will to power” (Foucault 1971, 8; cf. Köger 1994, 81, 84). Mignolo’s conceptual move applies Foucault’s ideas on knowledge and power to the colonial/neocolonial character of modernity and speaks of “subalternized knowledges” (2007, 451). In consequence, Cree scholar Margaret Kovach makes clear that prioritized Western-based research practices and policies reproduce colonial relationships in the academy and that the epistemological challenge is to achieve a “systemic shift in the ideology of knowledge production” (2009, 28).

*Indigenizing the Academy* (2004), as formulated by Devon Abbot Miheusuah and Angela Cavender Wilson with their book title, means transforming Western understandings of Indigenous knowledges on many different levels and creating academic and scientific spaces where Indigenous values and knowledges are respected and supported (Abbot Miheusuah/Cavender Wilson 2), where Indigenous methodologies and decolonizing perspectives are included, where multiple truths are accepted,
where epistemic differences are bridged (Kovach 2009, 27-29; Kuokkanen 2007, 143; Tuhiwai Smith 1999, 7), and where subjectivity and spiritual components have legitimate value beside objectivity and empirical evidence (cf. Grenier, 40; cf. Deloria, 40). While some scholars and scientists have regarded non-Western ideas and thought along, this respect and acceptance of Indigenous and other non-Western epistemologies and employment of de-colonial strategies is increasingly practiced in Indigenous and Postcolonial Studies, but also in some branches of science and philosophy. While often Indigenous and postcolonial scholars act as pioneers recognizing pluriversality and employing decolonial methodologies, many collaborations of scholars from diverse epistemological backgrounds advance this practice (e.g. Barlow/Stone 2005; Kunuk/Mauro 2010).

Indigenous scholars mostly apply an inclusionist approach to indigenizing the academy, i.e. they acknowledge respectful work of non-Indigenous scholars, including Marxist, feminist, postcolonial, and other critical theories that help to expose and overcome Eurocentric hegemonies in societies, discourses, and university systems. At the same time, Indigenous academics alert us that including Indigenous knowledges into Western-dominated academies risks transforming oral-based epistememes into print-based epistemes (Kovach, 12), validating Indigenous knowledges and methodologies solely according to Western standards (Grenier, 55), and subjecting the knowledge to Western control (Grenier, 13, 55). Moreover, they warn against potentially appropriating, tokenizing, and exploiting the knowledge as it is already happening in the pharmaceutical industry. Indigenizing science and the academy must thus proceed along the principles of respect, recognition, reciprocity, and responsibility (Grenier, 42; Evans et al., 5; Kuokkanen, 144ff., 157). Integrated research approaches must be aware of neocolonial patterns in universities and consciously work against such patterns that are usually normatized assumptions hidden in the structures and operational procedures, be it power relations and hierarchies within the institutional system, contents of research, forms and presentation of research and results, theories and methodologies, forms of examinations, forms of speaking and (not) critiquing other people’s work, or the (lack of) acknowledgement of cultural contexts. Such integrated research must thus not be extractive, and must be accountable to Indigenous standards, honoring Indigenous worldviews (Kovach 28-29). Moreover, the academy must go beyond the much-tried and token “giving of respect” and seriously engage with Indigenous epistememes (Kuokkanen 149). In this regard, it is essential to understand Indigenous knowledges and practices not as static, solely traditional, and directed at a precolonial past, but, as point-

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6 Cultural Survival Canada states in 1995 that the “world market value of pharmaceuticals derived from plants used in traditional medicine had an estimated value of 43 billion United States dollars [USD] in 1985. Less than 0.001% of the profits have gone to the original holders of that knowledge” (qtd. in Grenier, 16). Cf. Tuhiwai Smith, 118-19.
ed out by Battiste, as dynamic, innovative, and changing according to neo/colonial influences, new technologies, and political developments (cf. Grenier, 6; Simon, 889). The term ‘traditional knowledge’ is also widely used; however, I propose that it is inappropriate and patronizing, because it locks Indigenous knowledge in the archaic and primordial and disallows Indigenous modernity. Instead, the term ‘Indigenous knowledge’ includes traditional and contemporary knowledges.

In general, indigenizing the academy does not mean privileging but equally including Indigenous epistemes, discourses, practices, and methodologies and interweaving Indigenous and Western knowledges, education, cultural beliefs, and values, with the aim to combine their respective competences (Tuhiwai Smith, 191). For example, Richard Atleo develops an Indigenous philosophical theory while integrating both Nuu-chah-nulth and Western philosophies (2004; 2011) and Jeannette Armstrong (2009) outlines Enowkinwixw, an Okanagan methodology for consensus-finding that might prove influential on Western political practices. Eduardo and Bonnie Duran craft an Indigenous psychological framework incorporating Jungian psychology and Indigenous cosmology (1995) and Jo-Ann Episkewew (2009) applies the psychological concept of post-traumatic stress disorder to Indigenous historical trauma. Gregory Cajete, in Native Science, explores Indigenous science paradigms according to Western categories of knowledge: Indigenous philosophy, psychology, ecology, herbolgy, holistic health, relationships to land and animals, and astronomy (2000). Robin Wall Kimmerer sees traditional ecological knowledge as feeding “Native science”. She integrates her Indigenous understanding of nature and her Western training as a botanist to propose her ideas of “an emerging relationship between indigenous knowledge and Western science” and of acknowledging reciprocal relationships between humanity and the environment in order to arrive at a wider ecological consciousness (2013, 139, 179, 210). Examples of scholarly acknowledgement of traditional Indigenous forms of aqua and agriculture in Canada and Australia are Judith William’s (2008) and Bruce Pascoe’s (2014) books. Also non-Indigenous scholars contribute to this pluriversal epistemological discourse. As mentioned earlier, David Peat merges his ideas on quantum physics and his understandings of Blackfoot knowledge (1994). As an example for the integration of Indigenous and non-Indigenous methodologies, Enowkinwixw is applied to contemporary non-Okanagan practices of consensus-finding and conflict resolution. It requires a fundamental rethinking of Western-dominated methodologies, a shift from individualistic being and doing to relational being and doing, and foremost, a focus on communal instead of individualistic benefits. Once this epistemological and ontological shift has begun to take root, the Indigenous method will prove beneficial, as it already guides decision-making processes at the Center for Ecoliteracy (CEL) in Berkeley (Barlow/Stone, 6, 7, 12).

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7 Cf. Walter D. Mignolo’s notion of ‘pluriversality’ (Mignolo, n.p.)
Such critical engagement with epistemic hierarchies and de-colonial integration of various non-Western and Western knowledge discourses is what Mignolo has described as “border thinking” or “border epistemology”: “the biographical sensing of the Black body in the Third World, anchoring a politics of knowledge that is both ingrained in the body and in local histories. That is, thinking geo- and body-politically” (2011, 2). This border epistemology, then, needs to “delink from territorial and imperial epistemology grounded on theological (Renaissance) and egological (Enlightenment) politics of knowledge” (2) – “[a] delinking that leads to de-colonial epistemic shift and brings to the foreground other epistemologies, other principles of knowledge and understanding and, consequently other economy, other politics, other ethics” (2007, 453).

Another aspect of the discussion of Indigenous knowledges is the precarious state of most Indigenous languages around the globe. Our globalized capitalist-driven world experiences a loss of languages at a disheartening rate. Half of the roughly 6900 living languages that exist today will be lost at the end of this century, while most of the remaining ones will be endangered. This linguistic ‘catastrophe’ goes back to global European colonization and modern imperialism. Zahid Akter explains that “European colonization alone counts for the death of hundreds of Indigenous languages around the world” (2014, 310). English, in its role as “language of commodity, knowledge, technology, and communication”, does not only displace “countless small Indigenous languages but marginalizes even big languages like Hindi, Bangla, Spanish etc” (311). Indigenous cultural, philosophical, and historical knowledge is tied to language that evolves from the land, as Jeannette Armstrong shows: “language arises as an expression of the ‘land’ and […] ‘Indigeneity,’ therefore generates literatures so deeply enmeshed in nature as to be the ‘metasource’ of the environmental ethic of a people” (2007, 31). Indigenous narratives and environmental ethics tied to land and forming Indigenous knowledge reside in the respective traditional languages. Much of this knowledge becomes decontextualized and at times misinterpreted through translation, or lost altogether with the language. There are many initiatives to preserve and teach Indigenous languages at community and institutional levels; many community-based initiatives integrate the teaching of environmental knowledges and local languages. In the same respect, Armstrong, in her dissertation “Constructing Indigeneity: Syilx Okanagan Oralitute and tmixcentrism”, employs Syilx terminology to expound Okanagan environmental understandings as contained in Okanagan oral traditional texts (2009); Zacharias Kunuk and Ian Mauro, in their documentary Qapirangajuq: Inuit Knowledge and Climate Change, interview many elders in five different Arctic regions about their environmental knowledge and observations due to global warming – the elders speak in Inuktitut (with English subtitles) in their homes, camps, or hunting grounds, thus transmitting Inuit knowledge in its cultural context. And yet, in both cases translation work is necessary and done for a wider understanding of the knowledge. Because of the loss of Indigenous languages one the hand and because
of the process of its integration in scholarship and science on the other, Indigenous knowledge will have to be translated into English or other European languages, a process that is highly critical and must be conducted with respect and care, and moreover with an expert understanding of the respective languages and knowledges.

This special edition consists of selected contributions to the conference “Indigenous knowledges and Academic Discourses” of 2014, one of the annual meetings of the Association for Canadian Studies in German-speaking countries (GKS) that was thematically organized by the GKS section “Indigenous and Cultural Studies”. As Richard Atleo has pointed out in the foreword, the conference provided an open critical forum to investigate the various relationships between Indigenous knowledges and Western academic discourses. The conference sought to explore what kind of Indigenous knowledges exist in the Canadian Studies disciplines, how Western academia and research can benefit from these knowledges and knowledge practices, how they can be included in a respectful way, and how already appropriated knowledge can be acknowledged as Indigenous contribution. Reflecting the GKS’s multidisciplinary character, the contributions come from various disciplines, such as history, cultural studies, literary studies, linguistics and Indigenous studies, that all cross disciplinary boundaries and engage in interdisciplinary scholarship. Moreover, the foreword and two articles were written by Indigenous scholars that offer great insight into Indigenous perspectives on epistemological power relations, knowledge practices, and new ways to integrate pluriversal knowledges and methods. They are complemented by six contributions by non-Indigenous authors, who, in order to arrive at de-colonial scholarship, approach their subjects with great respect, responsibility, and self-reflexivity, and who worked in close cooperation with Indigenous communities and scholars in projects, engaged intensively with diverse Indigenous knowledges, and/or based their own writing considerably on Indigenous scholarship.

Jeannette Armstrong explains how layers of Syilx Okanagan knowledge are contained in stories and oraliture that have been transmitted through generations. Using categories of oral literary vehicles that were developed as tools of analysis for Western oral traditions in her discussion of the Okanagan novel *Cogewea*, Armstrong actively combines Indigenous and non-Indigenous narrative concepts while producing what Mignolo would call de-colonial epistemology. She then looks at how her great-aunt Mourning Dove (Hum-ishu-ma) has used Syilx story characters and story grammar as conceptual plot devices in *Cogewea*. Drawing upon Latin American thinkers and other eminent theorists, John Carlson critically engages with the colonial epistemic violence of re-naming and reducing Indigenous knowledge concepts and traditional practices according to a Western understanding, in essence homogenizing the two distinct concepts ‘Manoomin’ and ‘wild rice’. This imposing of Eurocentric knowledge patterns upon the other knowledge system de-legitimates
and abrogates the Indigenous knowledge which then runs the risk of becoming discontinued in a society with an all-encompassing Eurocentric education system. He explains why ‘Manoomin’ is not ‘wild rice’, harvesting the plant being a system of governance, a “complex process involving political, economic and spiritual relations and responsibilities” with social functions that, in turn, among others enable people to have a relationship with Manoomin. He suggests Anishinaaabe-manoomin as de-colonial epistemic practice that critiques both Western imperial and Indigenous nationalist discourses as dogmatic affirmations of difference. At the same time, Anishinaaabe-manoomin involves thinking from both perspectives, engendering “possibilities of dialogue and imagination beyond the pseudo-absolutist identities and social relations forged through the coloniality of power.” In the following article, Hartmut Lutz suggests respectfully that Western scholars listen to Indigenous voices such as Armstrong’s and Carlson’s in order to better understand the historical epistemicide in public and academic discourses and to gain an understanding of Indigenous knowledges and their importance not only for Indigenous cultures but for the current production of knowledge around the globe. He studies the reasons why Indigenous ontology, epistemologies, and axiology were not accepted throughout the Western world, looking at naturalized premises of Christianity, the Enlightenment and the hierarchized divide between literacy and orality. He furthermore discusses what we neglected to learn from Indigenous social and knowledge practices – relationality, accountability and an identity embedded in the land – before pondering one key trope of Eurocentric philosophical thought, Cogito ergo sum, and offering an indigenized version.

Şükran Tipi, in French, explores the inextricable link between toponymy, linguistic and cultural knowledge, and Indigenous territories. The article outlines a current multidisciplinary research project of the Innu First Nation of Mashteuiatsh, located at Lake Saint-John (Quebec), that documents Indigenous knowledge, including place names, related to the ancestral territories of the Pekuakamiulnuatsh. Having participated in the project, Tipi illustrates the material and spiritual role places played and still play in the conserved and produced knowledge of the Innu in Northern Canada. Likewise, Indigenous knowledge is essential for the production of history discourses, for example in connection with the establishment of World Heritage Sites such as the Tr’ondëk-Klondike. With both archival and community oral history material on Chief Isaac’s and other Hän leaders’ efforts to create mutual dialogues, including dance performances, a potlatch, and participation in the Dawson pageants, David Neufeld, of Parks Canada, outlines an approach to history that includes the historical narratives of both the local Hän people and the non-Indigenous locals in order to create a respectful and meaningful commemoration of the region. Only if knowledge pluralism is achieved, he argues, prospective visitors of the Tr’ondëk-Klondike site can “understand the shared history and distinctive material culture written on the landscape of the Tr’ondëk-Klondike.” Wolfgang Klooss, in German, delineates another pluralistic historical discourse in his meticu-
lous study of Métis historiography by non-Indigenous and Indigenous authors. Reflecting critically upon the work of non-Indigenous historiography and its unilat-
eral narrative of Métis that has become accepted part of Canadian history for a long
time, Klooss incorporates autobiographical fiction, commissioned work of Métis
Associations, and newer works of Métis historians into his study. The latter have
developed new research matrices that incorporate oral tradition accounts, church
records, and communal history as well as Indigenous concepts such as wahkootowin
(a holistic Cree concept that sees people in relation to all beings) as research para-
digm and methodology. Klooss also observes a methodological shift from writing
macro historical accounts with major events and historical figures to authoring
micro historical narratives with small-scale community, family, or clan-oriented
research focus; and likewise a departure from the individual specialist to research
collectives with increasing women participation. In a similar vein, Jessica Janssen's
article, in French, argues for the imperative inclusion of Indigenous perspectives in
history discourses, here of Quebec. She embeds her argument in the context of
decolonizing academic discourses as called for by scholars like Linda Tuhiwai Smith
and Shawn Wilson. Mainly with the example of the Huron/Wendat historian George
E. Sioui, she outlines characteristics and methods of Indigenous autohistory, which
will contribute to a rewriting of the image and the role of Indigenous people in
Canadian historiography and thus integrate Indigenous knowledge into academic
discourses. Indigenous autobiographical writing, as special form of autohistory,
challenges Western understandings and standards of autobiographical writing as
well as the academic study of such works, as Katja Sarkowsky argues. Focussing on
Maria Campbell's *Halfbreed* (1973) and Joy Harjo's *Crazy Brave* (2012), Sarkowsky
studies narrative structures and strategies as well as how ideas of self, community,
and autobiographical knowledge are reflected in the texts. They produce different
forms of cultural knowledge, about the relationality of the self, community, and
responsibility, with self-appointed “narrative agency.” Through collective memory, or
“postmemory,” running through the texts, these works manifest a shift in life writing
from an individualistic text to a text of a life – both text and life being embedded in
and produced through the community. The article shows how Indigenous life writ-

ing “convey not only Indigenous life knowledge – knowledge about how a life is
and can be led – but also Indigenous auto-bio-graphical knowledge – knowledge
about how a life can be told.” This is another example of how Indigenous knowledge
production influences and complicates established academic practices and disc-
ourses and extends the notion of what counts as academic knowledge.
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**Filmography**